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Abstract 
We review the economic literature on the impacts of the several dimensions of education 
upon intergenerational inequality persistency. It is firstly outlined that the critical increase in 
the population education level in all countries has not come with lower inequality. The basic 
tools of education and intergenerational mobility modelling are subsequently exposed (OLG, 
education functions, education decision making etc.). The following two theoretical sections 
analyse the cases in which education leads (i) to human capital convergence in the long term 
and (ii) to social stratification with the emerging of under-education traps (situations in which 
certain dynasties remain continuously under-educated). A simple modelling of both cases is 
proposed for two types of educational decisions, one based on the family expenditure on 
education and the other on the time spent for education. The factors that generate social 
stratification and under education traps are especially underlined. The empirical literature on 
the determinants of educational attainment and intergenerational mobility is finally reviewed. 
This reveals the crucial impact of family backgrounds on educational attainment in all 
countries. It also demonstrates huge and lasting differences across countries in terms of 
intergenerational mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the early seventies, both the proportion in a generation of tertiary education graduates 
and the educational level of the working population have substantially increased in all 
developed countries as well as in most of the emerging economies. However more education 
has not meant more equality and the general upgrading of skills has coincided with growing 
within-country income inequality. Over the same period, intergenerational persistence of 
inequality has remained high in a large number of countries, and the differences in 
intergenerational mobility have remained significant across countries. In addition, several 
works reveal that intergenerational mobility is very low at both ends of the income and 
education spectrum. This shows (i) that under-education and poverty traps could exist, and (ii) 
that the same families constitute the best paid and the most educated group from one 
generation to the next. In a number of countries, the combination of intergenerational 
persistence (i.e., the hierarchy of families is maintained over time) and growing income and 
educational within-generation differences tend to create inegalitarian dynamics with a high 
social and family related determination.  
Since the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1976), economists have proposed a wide 
range of theoretical models portraying intergenerational educational dynamics within market 
economies. The early theoretical works predicted a convergence of all dynasties towards the 
same human capital level in the long term. Since this seemed at odds with observed 
developments, the analysis has subsequently shifted to the explanations of persistent 
intergenerational inequalities in education and of the genesis of under-education traps, i.e., 
situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from one generation to the next. There 
are many explanations for this: imperfections in the credit market, fixed costs of education, 
neighbourhood effects and local externalities, differences in altruism between families, 
structure of the educational systems etc. There are thus a number of factors that rule out any 
educational convergence of dynasties. 
In line with the theoretical analyses, the empirical literature has attempted to quantify (i) 
the impact of parental characteristics on their children’s income and educational attainment, 
and (ii) the influence of extra family determinants. This makes it possible to measure (i) 
intergenerational mobility and its variation over time, (ii) the different channels through 
which the family and parental backgrounds impact on the individuals’ income and educational 
attainment, and (iii) the impact of different factors, particularly social and education policies, 
to prevent the widening of persistent inequalities due to educational divergence across 
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dynasties. The empirical results confirm a crucial impact of the family backgrounds, but the 
impact critically differs across countries. Family characteristics have substantial impacts in 
the US, but their influence is much lower in Nordic countries. Both educational public 
expenditure and educational systems bear significant influences on human capital formation, 
albeit with different impacts from their different dimensions. In contrast, the neighbourhood 
effect and credit constraints have rather limited impacts. These may however significantly 
differ depending on the individual’s social group.    
Section 2 depicts the main developments and stylised facts in terms of educational 
attainment, education premium and intergenerational mobility over the thirty last years by 
focusing on the case of developed countries. Section 3 examines the bases of intergenerational 
human capital analyses, i.e., the education function, the educational decisions of 
individuals/families and the shape of education policies and systems. Section 4 presents the 
dynamic model(s) that predicts human capital convergence and its conditions. The reasons for 
the emergence of under-education trap and their modelling are examined in Section 5. Section 
6 describes the empirical literature on the determinants of IM of income and education by 
examining its methodological issues and main results. We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Stylised facts 
Three main stylised facts may justify the issues examined in this chapter:  
1) A general skill upgrading of the working population in advanced countries;  
2) An increase in the skill premium and in skill inequalities.  
3) A significant intergenerational persistence of social positions in a large number of 
advanced countries. 
 
2.1. General skill upgrading 
The educational level of the working population has substantially increased in all advanced 
countries since the 1960s. This can be seen from Figure 8.1 that depicts the share of the 
population over age 25 with tertiary education for six sets of advanced countries over the 
period 1950-2010. However, the periods and pace of skill upgrading can critically differ 
across countries, resulting in non negligible skill differences.  
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Source: Barro & Lee, 2010.
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Fig 8.1: Share of the population (25 and over) with tertiary education 
 
2.2. Increasing inequality between skilled and unskilled workers 
The increase in inequality in advanced countries as well as in most of the emerging 
economies has been described and analysed in Chapters 1 and 2. This shows that skill 
upgrading has not been accompanied by a decrease in inequality either in advanced or in most 
of emerging countries. In addition, the coincidence of skill upgrading and higher inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers can be interpreted in two ways. This can firstly show a 
divergence in the variations of the wage values of the different skill levels benefiting the 
highest skills. It can also stem from an increase in skill that is higher for the children from 
highly educated and affluent families than for those from little educated and poor families.   
 
2.3. Intergenerational mobility 
Intergenerational mobility can be broadly measured by considering transition matrices. The 
transition matrix  ij  provides the percentage ija  of individuals with the education level j 
and whose parents possess the education level i in the population, 1ij
j i
  . Then, 
ˆ
jj
j
   is the percentage of individuals who possess the same educational level as their 
parents, and ˆ1m    measures intergenerational mobility. Identically, ij
j i
a   is the 
percentage in the population of the individuals who possess an educational level higher than 
that of their parents, i.e., a is a measure of ascending mobility, and ijj id   is a measure 
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of descending mobility.  Of course, such indicators provide broad and imperfect measures of 
mobility. In particular, they fail to account for the fact that mobility as well as upward 
mobility is more likely in countries in which a low proportion of the population was highly 
educated in the fathers’ generation than in those where this represented a large proportion of 
the population. In addition, when everyone steps up the skills ladder, this general move must 
be excluded from the calculation to obtain an adequate measurement of social mobility. 
 
Table 8.1  Intergenerational mobility indicators (2005) 
 Mobility indicator m Ascending mobility a Descending mobility d 
France 69 63.6 5.4 
Italy 70 66.6 3.4 
Netherlands 71 62.1 9.0 
Spain 61.5 58.0 3.6 
Sweden 80 74.2 5.7 
UK 79.6 73.2 6.4 
        Source: own calculations from EU-SILC data, 2005, intergenerational module. 5 skill levels. 
 
Table 8.1 depicts the mobility indicator ˆ1m   , and the upward and downward mobility 
indicators a and d for six advanced countries in 2005. Skill immobility concerns between 20 
and 40 percent of the individuals and differences across countries are substantial. To measure 
social mobility it is however necessary to correct these coefficients by considering the general 
intergenerational skill upgrading. This would result in lower mobility. In addition, mobility 
can lead to higher inequality when upward mobility is larger in the already educated families 
than in the low educated ones. For the UK, Machin (2007) shows that the extension of tertiary 
education has been significantly higher in high skilled families than in low skilled families. 
For France, Cahuc et al. (2011) utilise the results of the PISA survey to diagnose that the 
increase in the education level of the population has been accompanied by a significant 
increase in educational inequality, particularly in the 2000s.  
 
3. Intergenerational mobility analyses 
Intergenerational mobility has long been a crucial concern for sociologists. Since Becker and 
Tomes (1976, 1979), it has also become a relevant component of economic analysis. Even if 
intergenerational mobility is a multidimensional phenomenon, economists have put forward 
the transmission of human capital as a major determinant of the intergenerational transmission 
of income inequality. If intergenerational mobility depends on the intergenerational 
persistence of income differences between families and if individuals’ incomes are essentially 
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determined by their skill, then the acquisition of human capital is a key factor in 
intergenerational mobility. Education is thus at the core of this analysis.  
In the economic literature, the choice for education is modelled by the combination of 
education functions and objective (utility) functions of individuals that result in a decision 
process inside the family. We now present the main characteristics of education functions and 
of this decision process. 
 
3.1. Education functions 
An education function determines the individuals’ human capital by the combination of 
educational inputs. It is a production function of human capital. 
Since we are concerned by intergenerational analyses, we define an individual by both 
her/his dynasty (succession of individuals linked by a parent-child relationship) and the 
generation s/he belongs to. We suppose overlapping generations (OLG). The family 
comprises two members, one parent and one child. In all cases, there is thus one individual 
only in each dynasty at each generation. We denote individual (i,t) the t-th generation of 
dynasty i. We also assume that the number of dynasties M, and thus the number of families, 
remains constant.  
Each individual lives three periods of time, being successively young, of working age and 
in retirement. When young, the individual cannot work and s/he lives at her/his parent’s home 
who freely provides her/him with food and accommodation. Introducing a retirement period 
creates savings, which is necessary to fund children’s education.  
Let ith  be individual (i,t)’s human capital. An education function can be represented by: 
   1, ,it it t ith H x z h            (8.1) 
where itx  is a vector of characteristics of dynasty i at period t, tz  a vector of characteristics 
that are independent from the individual and her/his dynasty and that impact on individual 
(i,t)’s human capital, and 1ith   the human capital of individual (i,t)’s parent.  
Remarks:  
1. We assume that the shape of the education function does not vary with time; otherwise 
(8.1) would become  it th H  . 
2. Suppose that the vectors itx  and tz  are constant over time. Then education function 
(8.1) determines a human capital intergenerational mobility function in which one 
individual’s human capital directly and solely depends on her/his parent’s human capital.  
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3. When the education system consists of different cycles, there are several education 
functions corresponding to each cycle. 
Intra-family determinants 
The impact of intra-family (and thus intra-dynasty) factors upon one individual’s human 
capital is captured in relation (8.1) by both the human capital of the parent 1ith   and by the 
vector itx  of the family characteristics.  
As regards intra-family direct transmission of human capital and ability, two types of 
approach have been developed.  
In the first (Becker & Tomes, 1976, 1979, 1986), the child’s education depends on her/his 
ability that comprises a genetically transmitted component (the parent’s ability) plus a ‘luck’ 
random component. The education function is of the type  ,  it ith H a other determinants , 
with the individual’s ability ita  determined by dynamics 1it it ita a   ,   being the ability 
inheritance coefficient, 1ita   the parent’s ability and it  the random luck. Assuming 0 1  , 
the initial ability level bears no impact on the dynasty’s ability in the long term. 
In a second type of approach (Galor & Tsiddon, 1997), the child’s education depends on 
an intra-family human capital externality, i.e., on the direct transmission of human capital 
inside the family. This comprises both the knowledge directly acquired from the parents and 
the transmission of capacities of reasoning and analysis, and thereby of the ability to capture 
the knowledge provided to the child by the educational system. This approach is the one 
selected in function (1).  
Concerning the vector itx , four main family characteristics have been put forward:  
- The first is the parents’ expenditure on their children’s education that depends on their 
income and wealth and on their altruism towards their children. When the parents’ incomes 
depend on their human capital, which is typically the case, this provides an additional channel 
by which 1ith   impacts on ith . In a number of works, the impact of parents’ human capital on 
their children’s human capital solely depends on the money transfers from the former to the 
latter. These transfers can derive, either from altruism and bequest as in Galor & Zeira (1993) 
and Maoz & Moav (1999), or from children borrowing from their parents because of 
imperfections on the credit market as in Barham et al. (1995).  
- The second determinant consists of local externality generated by neighbourhood effects 
(Benabou, 1993, 1994, 1996a,b,c; Durlauf 1994, 1996). If the families with similar education 
and income levels tend to gather in the same districts, then two mechanisms influence the 
children’s educational level. Firstly, the children from educated families will benefit at school 
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as well as in their private activities from human capital externalities from other children also 
belonging to educated families. In addition, schools will benefit from better facilities and 
better teachers in the prosperous districts where families pay more taxes.  
- Thirdly, educated families may attach greater importance to education and be in this 
respect more altruistic towards their children’s education than less educated families. 
- Fourthly, educational attainment depends on the effort for education, on the schooling 
time and on the amount expended on education. The first typically depends on the 
individual’s choice whereas the last two may depend on both the individual and the family 
decision.  
Finally, other family characteristics can be added to the education function, particularly in 
empirical estimations: belonging to a native or an immigrant family, the sector in which the 
parents work, the number of people in the family, etc. These factors are less important for the 
theoretical long term analysis. 
Extra-family determinants 
There are several extra family determinants of the education function (vector tz  in equation 
8.1) and these primarily depend on the factors that influence schooling efficiency: public 
expenditure, teachers’ performance which depends on their skill, wage, etc., number of 
children per class and per teacher, selection system, compulsory schooling time, structure of 
the educational system etc. As regards these factors, the major determinants are the level of 
public education expenditure and the manner in which this is allocated to the different 
priorities (education cycles, teachers, equipment etc.).   
A synthetic education function 
We focus on log-linear functions that present the dual advantages of being easy to utilise and 
permitting direct interpretations through elasticities. From the above discussion, a simple 
synthetic education function can be written:  1it t it it ith e s h h    ,  , , 1          (8.2) 
with t  being the impact of public educational expenditure at period (generation) t, ite  the 
private expense for education, and its  the schooling time. The term  1ith   measures the 
intra-family human capital externality, and 0h   is the human capital without education.  
In addition, the contribution of public expenditure to the individual’s education t  is 
defined by: 
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 1 ,  0 1tt
t
Y
P
                (8.3) 
where   is the tax rate that determines the proportion of the parents’ generation total income 
1tY   devoted to public education and tP  the number of pupils of generation t.  
By combining (2) and (3) and assuming 0h  , it comes: 
 1 1tit it it it
t
Y
h e s h
P
                (8.4) 
Function (8.4) is an education function that includes the main determinants of human 
capital formation.  
It must be noted that functions (8.2) and (8.4) can be modified according to the selected 
educational scenario. For instance, if education is provided free of charge by the public 
authorities and the individual’s choice limited to schooling time, then (8.2) becomes  1it t it ith s h   . In contrast, when the schooling time is given and one individual’s human 
capital depends on her/his financial effort for education, then (8.2) becomes  1it t it ith e h   . Finally, an education system can comprise several education functions that 
portray different educational cycles.  
 
3.2. The education decision 
The education decision can be taken, either by the parents (as in Gradstein & Justman, 2002), 
or by the individuals themselves, or by the combination of parents and children decisions (this 
is particularly the case when the children’s education decisions depend on their parents’ 
bequest decision as in Galor & Zeira, 1993, and Maoz & Moav, 1999). We shall focus on the 
last two cases in which individuals participate in their education decision.  
Henceforth, we suppose that the economy produces one good with the technology 
1
M
t i i
i
Y h , where ih  is individual i' s human capital and i  her/his working time. For 
simplicity, total factor productivity is standardised at 1 and the price of goods is unity. In pure 
competition with zero profit, the real wage per unit of human capitalworking time is 1 and 
individual i' s income i ih . Individual i supplies 1i is    units of working time, is  being 
her/his schooling time when adult ( 0 1is  ).  
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Individuals adopt the education strategy that maximises their lifetime income, which is 
thus their objective function. They subsequently distribute this income between consumption 
at their different life periods (and possibly bequest).  
Several models of schooling decision are possible depending (i) on the education scenario 
and (ii) on the decision setting characteristics.  
We consider two education scenarios. In the first, education is limited to youth and 
individuals must pay for schooling. In the second, basic schooling is freely provided to the 
young, and the individual can allot a proportion of her/his active period for further education. 
Further education is also free so that the only cost of schooling is the opportunity cost of not 
working. Of course, combinations of these two scenarios are possible. In particular, the choice 
of schooling time can incur fixed and/or variable costs of education. Finally, during their 
senior period of life, individuals have retired and spend the funds they have saved during their 
working period. This is a prerequisite in order to ensure that individuals can borrow the 
money they need for subsistence during their schooling time and to pay their school fees.  
Both education scenarios lead to different decision models. In addition, the decision 
depends on the young people’s access to the credit market.  
When the youth period is fully devoted to education and adult time to work, and when 
human capital depends on private education expenditure, the individual’s decision is related 
to the amount of money s/he spends on education. With a perfectly competitive credit market, 
the young individual determines the expense for education by maximising her/his income as 
an adult subject to the education function  1it t i ith e h   . If a young person has no access 
to credit, s/he must receive education funding from her/his family, either as a loan, or as a 
gift. The decision is then shared between the young individual and her/his parent and the 
maximisation programme depends on the conditions for receiving the parents’ funding. In 
particular, a young can be restricted by the amount of funding provided by her/his parent.  
Assume now that individuals divide her/his active time of length 1 between schooling and 
work, that education is freely provided, and that the credit market is perfectly competitive. 
Then individual (i,t) chooses the schooling time its  that maximises her discounted lifetime 
income  1 exp
it
it
s
h rx dx  subject to the education function  1it t it ith s h h   . If there is 
a fixed cost of education, this cost must be subtracted from the lifetime income when 0its  . 
If individuals have no access to the credit market, the education decision depends on her/his 
parent’s loan or/and bequest.    
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From the above discussion, it is clear that the family characteristics have a crucial impact 
on educational choice. The related intergenerational dynamics can produce very different 
outcomes in the long term. 
 
3.3. Long term human capital profiles 
To provide a very simple description of the long term human capital dynamics, let us suppose 
that all the determinants of the education function are constant except those that depend 
directly or indirectly on the parent’s human capital. Then, the education function can be 
written  1it ith H h  .  Figure 8.3 describes several possible shapes of this function.  
Figure 8.3(a) depicts the case of a continuous, monotonically increasing and concave 
function. Then, all the dynasties tend towards the stable steady state hˆ  in the long term. In 
Figure (b) the function is continuous, monotonically increasing and convex. There are two 
steady states only one of which is stable. All the dynasties situated on the human capital 
interval  20,h  tend towards the stable steady state 1hˆ  that is an under-education trap, whereas 
all the dynasties whose human capital is higher than 2h  show their human capital to tend 
towards infinite in the long term. The continuously increasing education function depicted in 
Figure (c) presents fives steady states, three of which are stable. In the long term, such an 
education function typically results in a three-level social stratification of the population. 
Finally, Figure (d) pictures a non continuous increasing function. This can be interpreted as a 
two-level education system in which only the children with parents’ human capital higher 
than h  are authorised to move up the higher level. This defines two stable steady states 
( h and hˆ ) and thus a two-groups social stratification with the under-education trap h  when 
h h .  
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Figure 8.3: Shapes of education function and steady states 
 
Among the four shapes depicted in Figure 8.3, only the first produces in a convergence of 
all dynasties towards a unique human capital steady state, which ensures equality in the long 
term. This case has been initially prioritized by the economic analysis.  
 
4. Long term skill convergence  
Becker & Tomes (1979) were the firsts to build an intergenerational model that leads to 
human capital convergence of all the dynasties. This first contribution has been questioned 
because of certain unrealistic assumptions, particularly the hypothesis of perfectly 
competitive credit market. Loury (1981) and Becker & Tomes (1986) have shown that the 
convergence is maintained with imperfect credit markets, with however a slow down of the 
convergence process.  
We now present the dynamics of convergence in the two different models defined in sub-
section 8.3.2. 
 
4.1. The basic convergence models  
The basic model assumes a perfectly competitive credit market. Consequently, everyone can 
borrow money at the current interest rate. We show that, when the education function is 
concave, intergenerational dynamics result in the convergence of all dynasties towards the 
same human capital level. This is demonstrated for the two aforementioned decision models, 
i.e., (i) when the decision involves the expense for education and (ii) when it concerns 
schooling time. In both cases, we assume a utility function (1 ) log loga ru c c    , where 
hˆ  
hˆ  
th  
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
1th   1th   
h  h  
1hˆ  2h  
th  
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ac  and rc  are respectively the consumption during the working (adult) and retirement 
periods. Thus, the individual allocates the proportion   of her/his lifetime income to 
consumption during the retirement period. Since young individuals receive free food and 
accommodation from their parents, the utility function only relates to consumption during the 
adult and retirement periods. Finally, from the simple technology presented in subsection 2.2., 
the real wage per unit of human capitalworking time is 1.  
The expense for education scenario 
Everyone possesses a basic human capital that without loss of generality is equal to 1. In 
addition, individual (i,t) can increase her/his human capital by the amount ith  that depends on 
her/his private expenditure on education. Henceforth we call human capital the value ith  
above the basic endowment 1. Human capital ith  is determined by the education function  1it it ith e h   , with ite  the educational private expense and 1ith   the parent’s human 
capital.  
Being young, individuals determine their optimal human capital levels and they borrow 
the funds necessary to pay for their education. When they are working adults, they allocate 
their income from working (i) to refund their loans, (ii) to consume, and (iii) to save for their 
retirement time. When retired, they consume their savings. 
The individual firstly chooses the education strategy that maximises her/his lifetime 
income. S/he subsequently distributes this income between the consumptions during her/his 
working and retirement periods by maximising the utility function.  
Individual (i,t) maximises her/his discounted net lifetime income 1it it t itI h e    
subject to the education function  1it it ith e h   , with 1t tr    and tr  the interest rate at 
which generation t borrows from generation (t-1), and thus the return to saving for generation 
(t-1). This determines the optimal educational expense: 
  1/(1 ) /(1 )1iˆt it
t
e h
                (8.5) 
The related intergenerational human capital dynamics is defined by: 
  /(1 ) /(1 )1/(1 ) 1it it
t
h h
                   (8.6) 
Assuming that 1   , function (8.6) is concave as depicted in Figure 8.4 (note that this 
curve shifts with time as t  is moving): 
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Figure 8.4: Intergenerational human capital mobility  
 
Finally, the interest rate tr  is determined by equalising the demand for credit of generation 
t and the supply of credit of generation t-1 (see Appendix 1).   
Such an economy tends towards a steady state in which the interest rate remains constant 
and all dynasties have he same educational expense eˆ  and the same human capital hˆ , and 
thus the same lifetime income (see Appendix 1 for the determination of the steady state).  
A simple configuration of this general case is when the interest rate is nil, i.e., 0,tr t  . 
This happens when, at each generation, the parents’ total savings are higher than the children 
total demand for credit for r = 0, thereby resulting in r = 0 at equilibrium. Then, the 
individual’s educational expense is   1/(1 )1it ite h   , the related intergenerational 
human capital dynamics is   1/(1 )1it ith h    and the human capital steady state to 
which all dynasties converge is 1/(1 ) /(1 )hˆ           
The schooling time scenario 
As they are young, all individuals receive a freely provided basic education that ensures a 
basic human capital level 1. They subsequently divide their active period of length 1 between 
further education and working in the proportions its  and (1 )its , subscript it indicating the 
individual’s dynasty and generation. Further education being provided free of charge, the only 
related cost is the opportunity cost of not working. The further education function is  1it it ith s h    and we suppose that 0 0,  1...ih i M   , which is the condition for 
education to be effective for everyone at the initial time. As above, we henceforth call human 
capital the value ith . 
45° 
 1/ 1 11it it
t
h h
            
1ith   
ith  
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Individual (i,t) firstly chooses the education time its  that maximises her/his income 
(1 )(1 )it it itI s h    subject to the education function  1it it ith s h   . The individual 
subsequently allocates this income to the consumptions of both periods of her/his adult life.  
The maximisation of income determines the optimal schooling time its  that is an 
increasing function of the parent’s human capital 1ith   (Appendix 2). It can be shown 
(Appendix 2) that all the its  tend towards the same steady state value sˆ  and thereby all 
dynasties tend towards the same human capital steady state  1/(1 )ˆ ˆh s   .1 
In both cases under analysis, i.e., when the individual’s decision involves the education 
expense and when it concerns schooling time, we have shown that the optimal decision 
generates the convergence of all dynasties towards the same steady state human capital. We 
could determine the same outcome by combining these two shapes of decision.  
 
4.2. Credit constraint and low mobility 
In a number of situations, the existence of an imperfect credit market does not eliminate the 
convergence of dynasties towards the same human capital, but it slows down the transition 
process to the steady state. This was firstly shown by Loury (1981) and Becker & Tomes 
(1986). Such a situation is called by Piketty (2000) a low mobility trap.  
There are several means of including credit market imperfections in the education 
scenarios. The simplest way consists in assuming a risk premium that is paid by children from 
poor families. As income increases with human capital, then the higher the parents’ human 
capital, the lower the risk premium and thus the interest rate paid by their children. A more 
restrictive assumption is to suppose that young people have no access to the credit market. 
Their funding for education can thus be carried out, either by borrowing directly from their 
parents, or through parents’ bequests that depend on intra-family altruism.  
Higher risk premium for children from poor families 
When the risk premium is a decreasing function of the parent’s income, the unit cost of 
education is higher for children from poorly educated families, who therefore reduce their 
education. This slows the transition to the steady state down, albeit without preventing the 
convergence of all dynasties towards the same human capital steady state. The reason for this 
                                                 
1 The case presented here implicitly assumes that individuals can borrow with a zero interest rate. The same 
outcome may be shown by assuming non-zero interest rates (proof available upon request). 
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is simple. Even if the payment of a risk premium reduces education, it does not prevent the 
increase of human capital from generation to generation. Thus, the risk premium decreases 
with each generation until the moment when the dynasty reaches the human capital with a 
zero risk premium. From this point, the dynasty is on the convergence path without risk 
premium2.   
Parents help their children 
Children have no access to the banks but they can, either borrow from their parents, or receive 
bequests from them.  
Let us firstly suppose that parents save for their retirement period and can thereby lend to 
their children at the current interest rate (Barham et al., 1995). This can be justified by the fact 
that, unlike the banks, they have access to information about their children’s ability. The 
children firstly decide on their optimal education expense by accounting for the interest rate, 
which determines their demand for credit. Two cases can then be distinguished. In the first, 
the parent’s savings are sufficient to provide the child with the funds they want to borrow. For 
them, there is thus no difference with the situation of perfect credit market. However, there is 
another possible case in which the parent’s savings are too small to meet their child’s demand 
for a loan. The child is thus constrained in her/his education, which result in lower and sub-
optimal human capital. The children in this situation are those from families where the 
parents’ human capital and income are low and generate savings too small to fund their 
children’s optimal schooling. Even if they are restricted in their education, these dynasties 
will sooner or later converge to the same steady state human capital as the unconstrained 
ones. This is because the human capital and income increases from one generation to the next 
even for the constrained dynasties, thereby releasing the saving constraint. From a certain 
generation, the constraint is dispelled and the dynasty can implement its optimal schooling 
decision.    
The same type of scenario can be applied in the case of bequests based on parents’ 
altruism. As in Galor and Zeira (1993)3, we suppose a paternalist altruism in which a bequest 
to their children is inserted into the parents’ utility function and we denote itb  the bequest 
received by individual (i,t) from her/his parent. It can be easily shown that this scenario is 
very much like the expense for education scenario in subsection 8.4.1. Individual (i,t) 
                                                 
2  Note that the human capital steady state can be attained before the risk premium becomes zero, which however 
does not prevent the convergence to this steady state.  
3 Unlike Galor & Zeira, we do not assume here a fixed cost of education that creates an under-education trap.  
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maximises her/his net adult income  1it it t it itI h b e     subject to the education function  1it it ith e h    and to the bequest constraint it ite b . As itb  is exogenous for individual 
(i,t), income maximisation results in the same optimal education expense as in Relation (8.5). 
Here again, two cases are possible. First, if iˆt ite b  then the individual can fund her/his 
optimal schooling decision. Second, if iˆt ite b  then the individual’s education is constrained 
by her/his parent’s bequest and lower than its optimal value corresponding to iˆte . Here again, 
this constraint tends to disappear because, as human capital and income increase from 
generation to generation, so does the bequest, which releases the funding constraint4.  
 
5. Under-education traps 
In the models presented in Section 8.4, the human capital intergenerational dynamics causes 
all dynasties to converge to the same human capital steady state in the long term. This is 
conditioned by the concavity of the education function that links the individual’s human 
capital to the human capital of her/his parent. However, empirical evidence seems to confirm 
the existence of under-education traps, i.e., situations in which the successive generations 
belonging to the same dynasty remain unskilled. Continuously convex education functions do 
not provide a convincing explanation for this because they are at odds with both logic and 
empirical evidence. Firstly, such functions mean that human skill tends towards infinite and 
that this skill upgrading is continuously accelerating, which is clearly unrealistic. Secondly, 
all empirical works show that the elasticity of the individuals’ human capital with respect to 
their parents’ human capital is lower than 1. 
An under-education trap (henceforth UET) is a situation in which certain dynasties remain 
under-educated from one generation to the next. UET can be permanent (i.e., these dynasties 
are indefinitely under-educated) or transitory (then, all the dynasties leave the trap sooner or 
later). The economic literature has put forward several reasons for the emergence of under-
education traps. In what follows, we discuss five possible explanations: a fixed cost of 
education; imperfect credit market combined with another constraint; S-shaped education 
functions; local externalities; the structure of the education system.  
 
 
                                                 
4 This is conditioned by the intergenerational increase in the bequest to be higher than the intergenerational 
increase  in demand for funding, which is typically the case for ‘normal’ utility and education functions 
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5.1. Fixed cost of education 
Since the articles of Galor & Zeira (1993) and Barham et al. (1995), the existence of a fixed 
cost of education has been recognised as generating under-education traps. Unlike both these 
models that assume imperfections on the credit market (and altruism in the case of Galor & 
Zeira), we show here that the existence of a fixed cost of education is a sufficient condition 
for generating an UET. For this purpose, we place ourselves in the most favourable situation 
in terms of borrowing, i.e. a zero interest rate, and we determine the impact of inserting a 
fixed cost of education into both models developed in sub-section 3.1. 
Let us firstly consider the model where young individuals decide on their education 
expense in which we introduce the additional assumption of a fixed cost of education k . With 
0tr   (and thus 1t  ) the optimal expense of individual (i,t) who decides being educated is  1/(1 )1( )it ite h    (Relation 8.5) and her/his resulting income 1it it itI h e k    . If 
s/he does not educate her/himself, her/his income is 1. Thus, s/he decides to be educated only 
if 1itI  . The condition for this is   1/(1 )1it ith h k   . It can easily be shown5 that 
there is a unique value  
1/
1
1
0
1
k
h
            of their parents’ human capital below 
which individuals choose not to educate themselves, and above which they choose to be 
educated. Since the non educated individuals have a human capital  h = 0, all the descendants 
of those who opt for no education will also remain non educated. As a consequence, all the 
dynasties with a human capital lower than h  at the first generation will remain indefinitely 
non educated, and all the dynasties with an initial human capital higher than h  will remain 
educated and converge to the steady state  1/(1 )hˆ     . This results in a two-group 
social stratification with an under-education trap.  
Let us now add a fixed cost of education k  to the model in which individuals choose their 
schooling time when they become adults. The optimal schooling time of educated individuals 
iˆts  is the same as in sub-section 8.4.1. (The schooling time scenario), i.e., 
                                                 
5  Inserting  1it it ith e h    and   1/ (1 )1it ite h   into   1/ (1 )1it ith h k    yields 
  1 1/11 / 1 0ith h k         . 
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 1 1ˆ ,  / 0it it its s h s h      (Appendix 2), which generates the net income 
1ˆ ˆ(1 )(1 )it it it itI s s h k
      . The individual chooses education if this income is higher 
than 1, i.e., 1ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )it it it its s h s k
     . This inequality determines a threshold value of the 
parents’ human capital h  above which individuals opt to be educated, and below which they 
choose not to be educated. Once one of its generations has selected no education, a dynasty 
remains indefinitely non educated. Thus, all the dynasties such that their initial human capital 
endowment is lower than h  remain indefinitely non educated, and all those with an initial 
human capital higher than h  converge to the steady state human capital  1/(1 )ˆ ˆh s   . 
Once again, this generates dual group stratification with an under-education trap. 
 
5.2. Credit market imperfection combined with another constraint 
When young individuals have no access to bank credits, they must obtain their education 
funding from theirs parents, either through loans, or through bequests.  
It can be firstly noted that this provides an additional mechanism through which a fixed 
cost of education can generate an under-education trap: if the parents’ saving or bequest is 
lower than the fixed cost of education, then individuals cannot fund their schooling (Barham 
et al., 1995, present such a model based on parents’ loans, and Galor & Zeira, 1993, a model 
of this type with parental altruism).  
Without fixed education cost, we have shown in subsection 8.4.2. that the lack of access 
to bank loans does not abolish human capital convergence when parents can finance 
education, even if their funding capacity is lower than their children demand for credit. 
However, this convergence can be impeded when certain factors prevent parents from saving 
or providing bequests. This can be the case of a minimum consumption level under which 
individuals spend all their income in order to consume. Of course, such a constraint supposes 
the OLG scenario to be modified. In particular, if individuals cannot save because their 
income is totally spent on consumption, they thereby have no resources to consume when 
they retire. Two types of modification can be considered. The first is to include a public 
retirement pensions scheme in the model, and the second to assume that individuals can work 
throughout their lives. 
Moav & Neeman (2012) provide an additional explanation for low saving rates in low-
income families. These families spend part of their incomes in conspicuous consumptions for 
economic status reasons whereas richer and educated families do not need to signal their 
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status by this way. The equilibrium generated by the authors is characterised by an increasing 
marginal propensity to save that might generate poverty traps.  
In summary, any constraint that prevents certain parents from saving makes their children 
fall into an under-education trap when imperfections prevent them from borrowing on the 
credit market.    
 
5.3. S-shaped education functions 
We have already indicated that the hypothesis of a continuously convex education function 
should be rejected. However, there is no reason to assume that this function is continuously 
concave. A noteworthy case analysed by Galor & Tsiddon (1997) is that of an S-shaped 
education function.  
 
Figure 8.5: S-shaped education function 
 
Let us suppose that the education function is that depicted by the bold curve in Figure 8.5. 
This generates three human capital steady states ( 1hˆ , h  and  2hˆ ), only two of which are stable 
( 1hˆ and 2hˆ ). All the dynasties with an initial human capital below h  converge to the low-
education steady state 1hˆ , and all those with an initial human capital above h  to the high-
education steady state 2hˆ . This creates social polarization with a highly educated and highly 
paid social group, and a little educated and poorly paid social group that gathers the dynasties 
remaining in the under-education trap. Nevertheless, Galor & Tsiddon (1997) show that this 
social stratification can be transitory. 
For the UET to be transitory, a sufficient condition is that the S-shaped education function 
moves upwards with time, thereby moving the convex part of the curve above the 45° line. 
This can result, either from a human capital externality in the education function or from an 
th  
h  
1hˆ  2hˆ  
1th   
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endogenous increase in the resources allocated to education. Both cases can be simply 
modelled by assuming an education function  it t ith H h , with ( )H   being S-shaped and 
t  increasing with time. In the case of a human capital externality in the education function, 
we have  1 1,  / 0t t th h       , with 1th   being the average human capital of the 
parents’ generation. In the case of increasing resources for education, then  1t tI    ,  1/ 0tI     , where 1tI   are the levies allowed for education,   the tax rate and 1tI   
the total income of the parents’ generation that increases with the education level of the 
population. In both cases, an increase in the average human capital level of the economy 
raises t  and displaces the S-shaped curve upwards. Once this upward move has placed the 
convex part of the curve above the 45° line, the UET disappears.  
It must however be underlined that the upward move of the S-shaped curve must be 
sufficiently high to cause the UET to vanish. Let us start from the bold curve in Figure 8.5. If 
a large number of parents are initially located between the human capital values h  and  2hˆ , 
then the curve moves upwards and this deletes the UET. In contrast, when a large number of 
parents are initially situated between 1hˆ  and h , then the curve moves downwards and the 
society tends towards a two-segment stratification with an UET and a highly educated social 
group. In Galor and Tsiddon (1997), the persistence of the UET is however prevented by the 
shape of technological change function.    
 
5.4. Local externalities 
The impact of local externalities and neighbourhood effects upon education, intergenerational 
mobility and persistent inequality has been particularly analysed by Benabou (1993, 1994, 
1996a,b,c) and Durlauf (1994, 1996). Their models show that the existence of local human 
capital externalities can explain the propensity of individuals to gather according to their skill 
and income levels, which generates educational advantages for the rich and educated families 
and persistent inequality across dynasties.  
There are several reasons why individuals with similar education levels tend to congregate 
in the same district. Firstly, the existence of human capital externalities incites parents to 
prefer areas with highly educated residents to boost their children’s education. Secondly, the 
districts with highly educated and rich residents perceive more levies, which improve 
education and public services. Thirdly, network effects improve professional opportunities for 
both parents and children in rich areas. Such gathering tends to exclude low educated and 
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poor people because the rich are ready to pay more for their houses and accommodation so as 
to stay together. This causes local segregation with the coexistence of rich areas with highly 
educated residents on the one side, and poor areas with poorly educated residents on the other.  
A very simple way to model the impact of local stratification is to assume an education 
function      , 1 , 1 1it d it d it ith h h h       , with subscript d indicating the district where 
family i lives. Individuals educate themselves when young and they earn an income equal to 
their human capital once they become adults. All children follow the education freely 
provided by the district and financed by a tax on the district families (parents) income at rate  . The value , 1 , 1d it d th h   is the average human capital in the district where dynasty i lives 
at generation t-1. Hence, , 1d ith   is the tax per pupil in district d at generation t-1. Thus,  , 1d ith    depicts the impact of public expenditure on education at the district level, and  , 1d ith   the local human capital externality (neighbourhood effect). We do not model here 
the stratification process that is endogenously generated by the families’ utility maximisation 
(see, e.g., Benabou, 1994). To simplify, we assume a two groups (high and low educated, i.e., 
d = H,L) local stratification that arises at the initial time (generation 0) and that is maintained 
from generation to generation. There are thus two education functions, i.e.,    , 1 1it L t ith h h      for low educated dynasties and    , 1 1it H t ith h h      for 
the highly educated ones, with , 1 , 1H t L th h  . It is clear that, compared to the situation with 
no stratification, intergenerational human capital growth slows for the low educated group, 
and accelerates in the highly educated one.  
In addition, the maintaining of social stratification in the long term depends on the 
coefficients of de education function. If 1     , both groups tend towards the same 
human capital steady state   11hˆ         . The convergence is thus realised, but it is 
slowed down by local stratification. If 1     , the human capital dynamics typically 
causes a the division of the society into two groups, one with low education6 and the other 
with a continuously increasing human capital.  
 
                                                 
6 Within the simple framework presented here, this group tends towards zero human capital, but it is easy to 
make it converge to a positive human capital level through a slight modification of our assumptions.  
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5.5. Education systems 
Several empirical works have shown that graduates from selective, high level colleges do 
have better labour market performances (Daniel et al., 1995, for Canada; Ono, 2004, for 
Japan; Dale & Krueger, 2002, for the US). Other empirical works underline the impact of 
education systems upon the differences in occupational attainment (Shavit and Muller, 2000) 
and in the transitions from school to work between countries (Kerckhoff, 2000). 
Since Weber and Durkheim, the impact of the very structure of education systems on the 
society, and particularly on social stratification, has been systematically analysed by 
sociologists (Weber 1906; Sorokin, 1959; Anderson, 1961; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1970; 
Baudelot & Establet, 1971; Boudon, 1973, 1974; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Thelot, 1982 etc.; 
Bidwell & Friedkin, 1988, for a review). It is however only recently that this issue has been 
broached by economic theory. The influence of the allocation of public funding between basic 
and advanced education upon growth, welfare and income distribution is analysed by Driskill 
& Horowitz (2002) and Su (2004). From a partition between basic and secondary education, 
the latter being divided into vocational and general studies, Bertocchi & Spagat (2004) 
propose a model that determines social stratification at the different stages of economic 
development. Chusseau & Hellier (2011) build an intergenerational model with three 
educational cycles (compulsory basic education, vocational studies and university, with a 
selection to enter the latter) that can generate very different social stratifications depending (i) 
on the public funding allocated to each cycle, (ii) on the initial distribution of human capital 
across dynasties, and (iii) on the severity of the selection procedure. This can engender under-
education traps in which dynasties indefinitely remain at the basic education level.  
It is rather easy to generate permanent social stratification from an elitist educational 
system. However, it can be shown that even with somewhat smooth selection procedures, the 
division of the educational system into several cycles that bring different human capital levels 
can generate social stratification and inequality.  
Let us firstly assume an elitist education system in which a fixed and limited percentage 
of the population   is selected at the end of compulsory basic education to enrol in the most 
prestigious establishments called universities (denoted U), whereas the rest of the population 
can choose, either to join the labour market directly, or to enter vocational education 
establishments (denoted V). The education functions are (i)  1it B ith     in basic 
education, (ii) (1 )it it V Vith s
    in vocational studies and (iii) (1 )it it U Uith s     in the 
universities, with U V  . At the end of basic education, the individual selects, either to 
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work directly, or to pursue higher education by comparing the returns of each possible choice. 
Her/his income is it  if s/he chooses direct working, and (1 )jit its h , when choosing further 
education of type j, j = V,U. Because of the education function, individuals always prefer 
university to vocational studies. Income maximisation determines the optimal schooling times 
Vˆs  and  Uˆs  respectively for vocational studies and university (Appendix 3). These optimal 
schooling times only depend on the type of study (i.e., on , ,j j V U  ). In such an education 
system, the proportion  of the most educated dynasties go to university, have a human 
capital and an income higher than other dynasties, and their human capital tends towards the 
steady state  1/(1 )ˆ ˆ(1 )U B U Uh s     . The remaining dynasties (in proportion 1  ) 
follow vocational studies, have lower human capital and incomes, and tend towards the 
human capital steady state   1/(1 )ˆ ˆˆ(1 )V B V V Uh s h     . This model generates a two-
group social stratification. In addition, it is possible to generate a permanent UET in which 
certain dynasties remain at the basic education level and tend towards the human capital 
steady state 1/(1 )ˆB Bh
   by adding to the model a fixed cost of further education. 
The model presented above is strongly elitist since only a fixed proportion of the 
individuals with the highest human capital at the end of basic education can go to university. 
Since these are the children of the most educated individuals of the preceding generation, the 
dynasties in the elite group remain unchanged from one generation to the next. However, 
considering the most prestigious universities and their selection procedures, this picture does 
not fall far short of the reality in a number of countries. In addition, social stratification can be 
generated with far less severe selection procedures. Suppose for example that a minimum 
human capital at the end of basic education is a precondition for going to the university, i.e., 
the general rule in education systems. Young individuals firstly follow compulsory basic 
education that determines their basic human capital  1it B ith    . They can subsequently 
either directly join the labour market or go to university, which provides human capital 
(1 )it it U Uith s
   , on condition that their basic human capital is higher than the threshold 
value  . Within such a system, everyone wants to go to university but only those with a basic 
human capital higher than   can do so. Since the human capital steady state corresponding to 
basic education only is 1/(1 )ˆB Bh
  , two cases are possible. If ˆBh  , then all dynasties 
will sooner or later go to university and they all tend towards the same human capital steady 
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state  1/(1 )ˆ ˆ(1 )U B U Uh s     . In contrast, if  ˆBh  , then all the dynasties with an initial 
human capital below   fall into an under-education trap and tend towards the low skill 
steady state ˆBh , and all those with an initial human capital higher than or equal to   go to 
universities and converge to the high skill steady state ˆUh . 
 
5.6. History matters 
In the mechanisms triggering under-education traps and social stratifications, the existence 
and dimension of each social group depend to a large extent on the initial distribution of 
human capital across dynasties. In addition, any shock that modifies this distribution 
(migration flows, change in the education system and in the social policy, openness resulting 
in changes in income distribution etc.) and/or any change in the education policy that 
modifies the education function have an impact on the social stratification. In a word: history 
matters. 
There is thus a multiplicity of possible steady states depending (i) on the model 
parameters, and (ii) on the initial distribution of human capital across dynasties. These 
multiple equilibria approaches comprise Banerjee & Newman (1993), Galor & Zeira (1993), 
Mookherjee & Ray (2003), Ray (2006), Borissov & Lambrecht (2009) etc.  
In these approaches, there is typically room for structural policies (educational policy, 
social redistribution, labour market institutions etc.) that can modify social stratification in the 
direction targeted by the social planner. In particular, if there is a welfare function maximised 
by the social planner, the latter can adapt its policy if the steady state that derives from the 
initial situation and the model parameters differs from its objective.   
 
6. Empirical evidence 
A large body of empirical literature has analysed the impact of parents’ earnings and 
education upon the earnings and educational attainment of their children. In this section, we 
firstly examine the methodological issues associated with the measurement and estimations of 
intergenerational mobility in terms of earnings and education. We subsequently set out the 
main results of the empirical literature on the subject. 
This review is centred on advanced economies. This is because (i) the literature is more 
abundant, more precise and the results more easily comparable for advanced economies, and 
(ii) the conditions of and returns to education can substantially differ between developed and 
emerging countries. 
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It must be noted that a majority of empirical works on the subject are distinct from theory. 
Such a lack of theoretical background signifies that the mechanisms underlying the results are 
not clearly identified. This can lead to different possible interpretations.     
 
6.1. Methods 
Intergenerational mobility can be approached either in terms of income and earnings or in 
terms of human capital and educational attainment. 
 
Intergenerational earnings mobility  
The intergenerational income or earnings mobility is typically measured by two indicators, 
the intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) and the intergenerational income correlation 
(IGC).  
The intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE)   is estimated from the following equation:     1log logt tY Y X        (8.7) 
with tY  and  1tY   being respectively the child’s and her/his parent’s permanent earnings, and 
X a vector of control variables that are independent from 1tY   and impact on personal income. 
The higher the elasticity , the lower intergenerational mobility. 
The intergenerational correlation (IGC)  , is defined by:  
1t
t
       (8.8) 
with t  the standard deviation of log earnings at generation t. As a result, 0 1   whereas   can be greater than 1. 
The IGC is justified by the fact that a larger deviation in earnings has an impact upon the 
IGE. It enables this impact to be rectified.  
The choice between both measures depends on the objective of the analyst. The IGC is 
better tailored to study the persistence of income hierarchy whereas the IGE is a better 
measure of the intergenerational dimension of earnings inequality within a generation.   
Finally, the estimate of   is biased (i) if the fathers’ permanent earnings are incorrectly 
measured, and (ii) if one does not control for the ages of both the individual and her/his father 
at the moment when earnings are accounted for. Using a single-year measure as a proxy for 
permanent earnings induces a substantial downward bias. It is thus necessary to measure 
permanent earning by the average earnings over several years (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 
1992; Mazumder 2005). Estimates can also be improved by controlling for the ages of both 
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fathers and sons/daughters at the moment when earnings are measured (Haider & Solon, 
2006; Baker & Solon, 2003; Mazumder, 2005; Grawe, 2006)7. In addition, when data on 
fathers’ earnings are missing, these are approximated by fathers’ education, professional 
occupation or social group (Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Dearden, Machin & Reed, 1997). Solon 
(1999) highlights the fact that these proxies can generate an upward bias in the estimate of .  
 
Intergenerational educational mobility 
Intergenerational human capital (or educational) mobility measures the influence of the 
parents’ educational level on their children’s educational attainment.  
Let us firstly suppose that educational attainment is a continuous variable. Then, as in the 
case of earnings, intergenerational human capital mobility can be measured by the parent-
child regression coefficient or the parent-child correlation.  
The intergenerational regression coefficient (IGR)   is estimated from equation:  
1t E E t Eh h X        (8.9) 
with th  and 1th   being respectively the child’s and her/his parent’s educational attainment, 
and X a vector of control variables that are independent from 1th   and impact on the 
educational attainment.   
The intergenerational educational correlation (IGEC) E  is:  
, 1
,
E t
E E
E t
         (8.10) 
with Et  the standard deviation of education in generation t. As for the IGC, 0 1E   
whereas E  can be greater than one. 
As the IGC, the IGEC takes into account the difference in educational dispersion between 
generations. In this respect, it can be noted that the sharp increase in educational attainments 
in recent decades has been matched by a rise of the variance of education.  
If education is a discrete variable, then intergenerational mobility can be measured from 
transition matrices. These provide the probability for a generation to move from one 
education level to another. From these matrices, it possible to calculate different indicators to 
measure different types of social mobility. A ‘perfect mobility’ means that the parent’s skill 
has no effect on her/his child’s skill (see Chevalier et al., 2009).  
 
                                                 
7 See the survey by Black & Devereux (2011).  
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Family characteristics 
The IGE as well as the IGR as determined by relations (8.7) and (8.9) can cover a wide range 
of family impacts. As underlined in Section 8.2, the impact of the family background 
combines several mechanisms and channels through which the parents and the family 
influence the children’s educational and professional attainment, and thus her/his income: 
1. Intra-family human capital externalities. 
2. The parents’ income that permits the funding of education. 
3. Informational differences that make children from skilled families better equipped to 
select the best educational strategies.  
4. Local externalities and neighbourhood effects that derive from the grouping in the same 
districts of families with similar educational and income levels. 
5. Networks effects for positions and occupations. 
6. Health inequalities linked to the parents’ educational levels. 
7. Genetic transmission of abilities.   
The most recent empirical works have attempted to distinguish and identify the impact of 
each mechanism (see the reviews in Holmlund et al., 2011, Black & Devereux, 2011, and 
Björklund & Jäntti, 2009). Several methods have been implemented for this purpose: analyses 
using siblings and twins, estimates using adopted children, neighbourhood correlations 
estimates, instrumental variable estimates, decompositions of intergenerational persistence, 
use of IQ, analyses of health transmissions, and analyses of intergenerational occupational 
similarities.  
Table 8.2 briefly features each type of analysis by focusing on its objectives and 
methodological aspects.  
 
Table 8.2  Objectives and methods of the recent empirical works 
Type of estimate Objectives Methods 
Sibling and twin 
analyses 
To assess the impact of family 
backgrounds and genetic 
transmission upon the individual’s 
education and earnings. 
 
1. Calculation of correlations in earnings 
between siblings (and between twins) j  and 
'j :     2' ', ,ij ij ij ij yCorr y y Cov y y   with 
ijy  the earnings of individual j in family i and 
2
y  the population earnings variance. High 
correlation between siblings shows the impact 
of family backgrounds. Higher correlation 
between monozygotic twins than between 
siblings shows the impact of genetic. 
2. Verification that siblings are more similar 
than randomly selected individuals.  
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Analyses using 
adoptees 
A comparison between adoptees 
and non-adoptees children allows a 
distinction between the impact of 
nurture (education) and nature 
(genetics) upon child’s earnings and 
child’s education. 
1. Estimate of bivariate regressions separately 
for adopted children and their non-adopted 
siblings: 1 0y y     , 1y  and 0y  being 
respectively the log earnings or education of 
the child and the adoptive parent. If nature 
(genetic) is determinant (secondary), 0   
will be low (high) for adoptees and high (low) 
for non-adoptees. 
2. Estimate of multivariate regressions using 
adoptees in order to determine what parental 
characteristics are determinant.  
3. Regressions on adoptees by using 
information on both biological and adoptive 
parents.  
Neighbourhood 
correlations 
To isolate, within brother 
correlations in earnings or in 
education, the impact from having 
grown up in the same 
neighbourhood.  
Calculation of correlation ( 2Cov  ) for 
unrelated children living in the same 
neighbourhood. A small correlation suggests 
that neighbourhood is not a predominant 
factor for explaining sibling similarities.  
Instrumental 
variable estimates 
To measure the (specific) effect of 
parents’ income (or education) on 
children’s income (or education). 
To identify a component of parents’ income 
(or education) that is unrelated with other 
parental characteristics (income related to 
welfare programs; income shocks due to 
labour market status; major educational shift 
that influence parents’ education). 
IQ and ability 
 
To assess the genetic transmission 
of ability within families. 
 
- Estimation of intergenerational and/or 
sibling correlations in cognitive skills 
(measured by IQ scores) over time.  
- To estimate and compare cognitive and non-
cognitive intergenerational transmission. 
 
In addition to the determinants directly linked to family characteristics, there are a number 
of factors that impact educational attainments and intergenerational mobility. These 
determinants depend on the type of intergenerational mobility (earnings or human capital) that 
is assessed. In addition, these cannot be limited to those depicted by vector X in equations 
(8.9) and (8.11) because a number of them are not orthogonal to the parents’ human capital 
and/or income. It is particularly the case of borrowing difficulties that impacts on educational 
choices and are typically linked to parental income and thereby to parental education level. It 
can also be the case of certain government policies such as scholarships and other public aids. 
Concerning human capital mobility, these factors are: educational public expenditures and 
their allocation between the different education cycles; number of pupils per class and per 
teacher; earnings of and skills of teachers; geographical distance to school; specific policies 
(scholarships and terms of award; reduced rate of interests for students etc.); skill and wages 
if teachers; severity of the selection procedures and changes in educational systems; education 
costs (fixed and variable) paid by families; imperfections on the credit market, etc.  
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Finally, the literature has analysed the existence of intergenerational persistence of earnings 
and human capital inequalities by focusing on the changes in IGEs and IGRs over time.  
 
6.2. Income intergenerational mobility 
The now large empirical literature devoted to the estimation of income intergenerational 
mobility reveals several major features: 
1. Intergeneration mobility measured by both IGE and IGC critically differs across countries.  
2. The countries with high mobility are more egalitarian than the countries with low mobility. 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland display lower earnings inequality than the US and the UK, as 
well as lower intergenerational transmission.  
3. Family background factors have a huge impact on earnings, and this impact is higher in the 
US than in the Nordic countries.  
4. A small impact of neighbourhood effects on adult earnings. 
5. A rather mixed evidence concerning the existence of credit constraints and of their impacts 
on adult earnings.  
6. Siblings twins and adoptees studies reinforce the diagnosis of a crucial impact of family 
backgrounds, but they also reveal significant differences across countries.   
7. Public expenditure on education particularly on primary education has a material impact on 
intergenerational mobility of earnings. 
Earnings intergenerational elasticities 
Table 8.3 displays the main estimates of father-son IGE of earnings for different countries. 
The lowest values of father-son earnings IGE are found in Nordic countries and Germany and 
the highest in the US and Italy.  The values found for the UK and France are in between.  
 
Table 8.3  Intergenerational mobility of earnings between fathers and sons (IGEs) 
Authors 
Country, Data set,  
Years of son’s earnings 
Income IGEs 
Annual earnings  0.54 
Zimmerman (1992) US, NLS 1981 
Hourly wage  0.39 
Father’s income 0.27 
Annual earnings 0.18 Altonji and Dunn (1991) US, NLS average of several years 
Hourly wage 0.26 
Jäntti et al. (2006) US, NLS 1995 and 2001 Family income 0.52 
Solon (1992)  US, PSID 1984 Annual earnings 0.41 
Shea (2000) US, PSID average of 8 years Annual earnings 0.40 
Eide & Showalter (1999) US, PSID 1991 Annual earnings  0.34 
Mulligan (1997) US, PSID average of several years Annual earnings 0.32 
Couch & Dunn (1997) US, PSID average of several years Annual earnings 0.13 
Björklung & Jännti 
(1997) 
US, PSID 1987 
Annual earnings  0.39 
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Lee & Solon (2006, 
2009) 
US, PSID yearly from 1977 to 2000 
Annual income 0.44 
Mayer & Lopoo (2004) US, PSID (cohorts 1949-1965) Annual income 0.41 
Atkinson et al. (1983) Britain, a sample of York, 1975-78 Hourly earnings 0.42 
Dearden et al. (1997) Britain, NCDS 1991 Weekly wages 0.57 
Jäntti et al. (2006) Britain, NCDS 1991 and 2000 Weekly wages 0.31 
Corak & Heisz (1999) Canada income tax records 1994 Individual income 0.17 
Lefranc & Trannoy 
(2005) 
France, FQP 1977, 1985, 1993 Annual earnings 0.41 
Jännti & Österbacka 
(1996) 
Finland, Finnish census 1990 Annual earnings 0.22 
Österbacka (2001) Finland, Census, 3-years average Annual earnings 0.13 
Jäntti et al. (2006) Finland, Census, 1993 and 2000 Annual earnings 0.17 
Couch & Dunn (1997) Germany, GSEP average of years. Annual earnings 0.11 
Wiegand (1997) Germany, GSEP 1994 Monthly earnings 0.34 
Björklung & Jännti 
(1997) 
Sweden, LLS 1990 Annual earnings 0.28 
Gustafsson (1994) 
Sweden, 222 Stockholm boys, 
average of 4 years 
Market income 0.14 
Österberg (2000) Sweden, SITR average of 3 years Annual earnings 0.13 
Jäntti et al. (2006) Sweden, SITR 1996 and 1999 Annual earnings 0.26 
Datasets: FQP: Formation et Qualifications Professionnelles. GSEP: German Socio-Economic Panel. LLS: Level 
of Living Surveys. NCDS: National Child Development Survey. NLS: National Longitudinal Study. PSID: Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. SITR: Swedish Income Tax Records. 
Sources: For the US: Solon (1999) Tables 3 and 4 except Mayer & Lopoo (2004) and Lee & Solon (2006, 2009): 
compilation by the authors / Other countries: Solon (2002) Table 1, except Lefranc & Trannoy (2005): 
compilation by the authors. 
 
In addition, several empirical studies have assessed whether intergenerational mobility has 
changed over time. For the US, Lee & Solon (2009) found little evidence of an over-time 
trend. For the UK, the estimates suggest an increase in earnings IGE for the cohorts born 
between the late 1950s and the 1970s (Blanden et al., 2004; Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007). 
Lefranc & Trannoy (2005) find no evidence of a trend for France. In contrast, the 
intergenerational mobility of earnings seems to have increased in several Nordic countries 
(Bratberg et al., 2005 for Norway; Pekkala & Lucas, 2007 for Finland).  
Sibling and twin correlations: the impact of family background 
The impact of family characteristics on earnings is rather substantial. The correlation of log 
earnings between brothers in the US is close to 0.4. Approximately 40% of the variation in the 
permanent earnings is due to a variation in the family characteristics shared by siblings (Solon 
et al., 1991; Altonji & Dunn, 1991; Ashenfelter & Zimmerman, 1997; Solon, 1999; Bjorklund 
et al., 2002; Mazumder, 2008). Bjorklund et al. (2002) find much lower estimates for Nordic 
countries (between 0.12 and 0.19). This suggests that family background is much more 
influential in the US than in Nordic countries.  
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The correlations in earnings between identical (monozygotic) twins are much higher than 
those for siblings or for dizygotic twins (Miller et al., 1995 for Australia; Isacsson, 1999 for 
Sweden; Ashenfelter & Krueger, 1994, and Rouse, 1997, for the US).  
Other determinants  
Neighbourhood effect. Most of the estimates point to limited effects of neighbourhood 
characteristics upon earnings. Using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Page & 
Solon (2003) find a correlation in adult earnings of 0.16 for unrelated boys in the same 
neighbourhood, i.e., half of their estimate of the brother correlation. Raaum et al. (2006) 
estimate neighbourhood correlations in earnings for Norway. They find a very low value of 
about 0.05 in log earnings for boys. For the city of Toronto, Canada, Oreopoulos (2003) finds 
neighbourhood correlations close to zero. Consequently, neighbourhood effects do not seem 
to be a major factor for explaining sibling similarities in adult earnings.  
Educational public expenditure. To verify whether countries with better public education 
systems display lower IGEs, Ichino et al. (2009) correlate estimated intergenerational 
elasticities of income and public expenditure in education (per student as a percentage of per 
capita GDP). They find a negative relationship. They also show that the coefficient is higher 
for public expenditure in primary education: primary education has a crucial impact on the 
individual educational attainment and thus on the individual earnings. Using the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID), Mayer and Lopoo (2008) find higher IGEs in US States with 
low per child government expenditure than in States with high per child expenditure.  
Educational reforms. The impact of education systems and reforms can be significant. 
Pekkarinen et al. (2009) studied the impact of the 1970s Finnish educational reform. They 
find that the reform (i) has lessened the IGE from 0.3 to 0.23 and (ii) has increased 
educational attainment. According to Machin (2007), the expansion of higher education in the 
UK in the 1980s and 1990s has significantly increased the proportion of children from high 
income families with college degrees but far less the proportion of children from low income 
families. He also finds that earnings mobility has decreased. 
Credit constraint. A simple way to study the impact of credit market imperfections consists 
in identifying groups who are more likely to be credit constrained. The empirical estimates 
show rather mixed evidence of the impact of credit constraints on earnings intergenerational 
mobility. Studying the case of Canada, Grawe (2004) makes the assumption that, for any 
given parental earnings, high ability children are more likely to be credit constrained. He 
proxies ability by child earnings and uses quantile regression. He finds no evidence for credit 
constraints. Using wealth data from the US Survey of Income and program Participation 
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(SIPP), Mazumder (2005) separates families by net worth8. He finds larger IGEs for low net 
worth families, a group more likely to be borrowing-constrained, but this result is not 
statistically significant at 5% .  
 
6.3. Human capital intergenerational mobility 
The empirical literature estimating intergenerational mobility in educational attainment leads 
to the following diagnosis: 
1. Intergeneration mobility measured by both IGR and IGEC critically differs across 
countries.  
2. The countries with high mobility are more egalitarian than the countries with low mobility. 
3. The impact of public expenditures on education is significant, but the different dimensions 
of educational policy produce very uneven impacts. 
4. A small impact of neighbourhood effects measured by neighbourhood correlations. 
However, certain empirical estimates trying to capture neighbourhood effects on educational 
attainment demonstrate a significant influence.  
5. Large effects of parents’ income on children’s educational attainment. 
6. A positive strong influence of early childhood environment and particularly of health.  
7. A strong correlation between fathers and sons in terms of professional occupations.  
8. The number of pupils per class, particularly in primary school, has a material effect on the 
child’s school performance.  
9. A low percentage of youngsters are credit constrained.  
10. Empirical estimates prove the existence of inequality traps.  
Educational intergenerational elasticities and correlations 
The impact of parents’ position on children’s attainment has been first estimated by 
intergenerational elasticities of education. In these works, human capital is typically measured 
by the number of schooling years, and OLS are used to estimate intergenerational human 
capital elasticities.  
Table 8.4. depicts the estimates of IGR for different developed countries. According to 
these estimates, the US and the UK seem to be less mobile than Germany, France and Nordic 
countries. This suggests that countries with low social mobility have a higher level of 
inequality than those with higher social mobility.  
                                                 
8 Net worth measures the ability of parents to borrow against their current wealth or to sell assets in order to 
finance human capital acquisition for their children (under or over the median net worth). 
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Table 8.4  Intergenerational coefficients for different countries  
Authors 
Country, 
region 
Data set 
Measures of 
human capital 
intergenerational 
regression coefficient 
(IGR) 
Plug & 
Vijverberg (2001) 
US, Wisconsin Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey  Schooling years 
0.227 for father  
0.230 for mother 
Mulligan (1997) US PSID 
Schooling years 0.32 (father-son) 
0.33 (father-child) 
Berham & 
Taubman (1985) 
US 
National Academy of Science - 
National Research Council (NAS-
NRC) Twin sample 
Schooling years 
Between 0.19 and 0.27 
(father-child) 
Olneck (1977) 
US, Michigan, 
Kalamazoo 
Sample of inhabitants of the city 
of Kalamazoo, Michigan 
Schooling years 
0.45 (father-son) 
Dearden et al. 
(1997) 
UK 
National Child development 
Survey (NCDS) 
Schooling years 0.424 (father-son) 
0.415 (father-daughter) 
Couch & Dunn 
(1997) 
Germany and 
US 
German Socio-Economic Panel 
(Germany) & PSID (US) 
Schooling years 0.42 for the US and 0.24 
for Germany (father-son)
Ben-Halima, 
Chusseau & 
Hellier (2012) 
France FQP, 1993 and 2003 
10 educational 
levels 
0.25 (father-child) 
Increase from 1993 to 
2003. 
Fabre & Moullet 
(2004) 
France FQP, 1993 
Schooling years 0.31 (father-son) 
0.29 (mother-son) 
Holmlund et al. 
(2011) 
Sweden 
Swedish Administrative Records 
(SAR) 
cohorts born in 1943-1955 S 
Schooling years 
0.23 (father-child) 
0.28 (mother-child) 
Björklund, 
Lindahl and 
Plug (2006) 
Sweden 
(Swedish Administrative 
Records) SAR, 1999 
Schooling years 
0.24 (father-child) 
0.24 (mother-child) 
Black, Devereux, 
Salvanes (2005) 
Norway 
Norweigan Administrative 
Records (NAR) 
Schooling years 0.22 (father-child) 
0.24 (mother-child) 
* Average of father’s and mother’s education. ** International Adult Literacy Survey. ***Formations et 
Qualifications Professionnelles **** International Social Survey Programme. $Living Standards Measurement 
Surveys.  
 
Intergenerational human capital mobility has also been measured by the intergenerational 
Education correlation (IGEC). Hertz et al. (2007) provide a survey of correlations and 
regression coefficients for a sample of 42 developed and developing countries (Table 8.5). 
The correlations are about 0.4 in Western Europe, between 0.3 and 0.35 in Nordic countries, 
and equal to 0.46 in the US. These estimates show that Nordic countries have a low 
educational intergenerational persistence compared to other countries. 
 
Table 8.5  Intergenerational educational persistence  
Country IGEC 
Italy 0.54 
US 0.46 
Sweden 0.40 
The Netherlands 0.36 
Norway 0.35 
Finland 0.33 
UK 0.31 
Denmark 0.30 
           Source: Hertz et al. (2007), Table 2. 
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It can be noted that a majority of empirical works measure human capital by the number 
of schooling years. This measure is disputable because it allocates the same weight to 
qualitatively different schooling years. Several studies have found decreasing returns to the 
schooling years (Psacharopoulos, 1994; Wössmann, 2003). Other estimates show that the 
market value of one schooling year can critically differ depending on the educational cycle 
and on the type of study (Jarousse & Mingat, 1986; Ben-Halima et al., 2012).  
A key issue is to know whether the general increase in educational attainment has coincided 
with lower intergenerational persistence. For 42 countries, Hertz et al. (2007) show that 
regression coefficients (educational intergenerational elasticities) have decreased over time 
whereas the correlation coefficients show no time trend. Checchi et al. (2008) find that the 
intergenerational correlation decreased from 0.58 for the cohorts born in 1910-14 to 0.47 for 
the cohorts born in 1970 or after. Blanden & Machin (2004) and Machin (2007) find that the 
expansion of higher education in the UK has favoured children of high income and high 
education families. Heineck & Riphahn (2007) find no change in the intergenerational 
mobility of education in Germany over half a century. Ben-Halima et al. (2012) reveal lower 
social mobility in France in 2003 compared to 1993, with a critical increase in the influence 
of the family backgrounds upon the individuals’ human capital.  
Intergenerational mobility of education measured by transition matrices 
Another way to measure intergenerational transmission of education is to study mobility 
matrices in order to examine the child’s level of education conditional on the human capital of 
the parent. For a panel of 20 countries, Chevalier et al. (2009) find results that are generally 
similar to the estimates of intergenerational elasticities or correlations (except for Denmark 
and Norway which are with the US the countries where the intergenerational link is the 
strongest).  
Decomposition of the family determinants 
IQ and genetics. A recent literature has studied the intergenerational transmission of IQ and 
cognitive skills and attempted to determine the ‘nature’ of the transmissions from parents to 
children (cognitive, non cognitive, genetic etc.). These works reveal (i) that children’s IQ are 
correlated to parents’ IQ (Black et al., 2009, for Norway) and (ii) that parents’ cognitive 
abilities matter more for educational attainment whereas non-cognitive abilities matter more 
for earnings (Gronqvist et al., 2009, for Sweden).  
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Nature versus nurture. Sacerdote (2007) uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) to analyse the difference between adoptees and non adoptees9. By regressing 
child’s education on mother’s education, he finds a higher coefficient for non-adoptees (0.32) 
than for adoptees (0.09). This suggests that nature could be more important than nurture in 
determining educational attainment.  
Income. From three longitudinal surveys of American high school leavers, Acemoglu & 
Pischke (2001) study the effect of family income on children's education, especially on 
college attendance. The estimates suggest large effects of family income on enrollments: a 
10% increase in family income is associated with a 1.4% increase in the probability of 
attending a four-year college. From the French FQP database, Ben-Halima et al. (2012) 
isolate the impact of father’s income on child’s educational attainment from the total impact 
of family background. This accounts for 24.5% of the total family influence (elasticity) in 
2003. They also find that the total impact of the family (father) upon the individuals’ 
education attainments has significantly increased from 1993 to 2003, and that this rise 
essentially derives from the family’s income.  
Other determinants  
Public expenditures and education systems. Chevalier et al. (2009) find that 
intergenerational educational persistence is lower in countries with higher public expenditures 
for education. From the French FQP database, Ben-Halima et al. (2012) find a strong impact 
of public expenditure upon child’s educational attainment (coefficient equal to 0.67 against 
0.25 for the intergenerational coefficient). They also find that both the impacts of educational 
public expenditure and of the family background have increased between 1993 and 2003. This 
result suggests that higher public expenditure for education could offset the increasing impact 
of the family. For Switzerland, Bauer and Riphahn (2009) find that early school starting age 
increases intergenerational educational mobility. An education policy promoting early school 
enrolment could reduce intergenerational persistence.  
Neighbourhood effect. As for earnings, the neighbourhood correlations are generally low as 
regards education (lower than 0.2 according to Solon et al., 1997, and of about 0.1 for Solon 
et al., 2000, for the US; smaller than 0.1 for Norway according to Raaum et al., 2006). It can 
however be noted that this does not mean that the neighbourhood effect has a negligible effect 
in the education function. 
In the case of France, Goux & Maurin (2007) find a significant impact of the 
neighbourhood effect upon children’s performance at school.    
                                                 
9 They consider Korean-American adoptees placed with American families between 1970 and 1980.  
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Burgess & Briggs (2010) analyze the relations between poverty, location and school 
assignment in the UK. From the Pupil Level Annual School Census and the National Pupil 
Database, they estimate the probability of enrolling high-quality schools for poor and non-
poor children. They show that children from poor families are significantly less likely to 
enroll in high-quality schools. 
Credit market imperfections. Some papers have checked the existence of credit constraints. 
The results show a low percentage of people who are credit constrained. Using data from the 
US Current Population Survey (CPS), Carneiro & Heckman (2003) compare the differences 
in higher education enrolment (2 or 4 years in higher education) according to whether parents 
belong to the earnings lower quartiles. Only 0 to 8% of young Americans seem to be credit 
constrained. Dearden et al. (2004) apply the same methodology to Britain and find credit 
constraints only for small-sized groups within the population.  
Number of pupils per class. Using data from the French Ministry of Education for a cohort 
entering primary education in 1997, Piketty & Valdenaire (2006) show that a one-unit 
decrease in the number of pupils per class during the second year of primary school leads to 
an increase of about 0.3 to 0.4 in the average score in Mathematics at the beginning of the 
third year, this increase attaining 0.7 for children from low-income families. Consequently, 
the number of pupils per class has a significant impact for pupils from families with low 
incomes.   
Inequality trap 
From the EHII index which is extend up to 2003,10 Daymon & Gimet (2007) verify the 
existence of inequality traps at the international level. They show the existence of inequality 
traps and highlight the significant influence of the credit market, wealth and access to the 
initial levels of education on educational attainment.  
 
7. Conclusion 
We have reviewed the economic literature that analyses the relations between education and 
intergenerational mobility, and their impact on inequality persistence.  
From a theoretical point of view, the early literature diagnosed a convergence in the 
educational level of the dynasties in the long term. This diagnosis has subsequently been 
                                                 
10 Estimation of the Household Inequality and Inequity Index from Galbraith and Kum (2003) database that 
provides data from 1963 to 1999 for 71 countries. Extension using UTIP-UNIDO (University of Texas Inequality 
Project and United Nations Industrial Development Organization) Database. 
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revisited and the emerging of social stratification and under education traps has been 
analysed. These stratifications and traps may be caused by a series of factors and/or of their 
combination: fixed costs of education, credit constraint, local externalities and neighbourhood 
effects, S-shape education function, educational systems etc. Finally, this literature comes to 
the conclusion that history matters. 
The empirical literature has ventured to measure the contribution of the different factors 
that influence intergenerational mobility in earnings and educational attainment. All the 
studies underline the importance of family backgrounds with albeit significantly dissimilar 
impacts across countries. In addition, the most recent literature has attempted to disentangle 
the different components of the family influence: education, income, genetically transmitted 
ability, neighbourhood, health etc. Public educational expenditure also has a significant 
impact. The results are more ambiguous concerning neighbourhood effects and credit 
constraints. 
One of the main challenges for future researches is to reunite empirical works and 
theoretical approaches. In fact, these two sets of literature have tended to develop 
independently, with the search for new data and empirical methods on the one side, and 
increasingly sophisticated modelling on the other. Many mechanisms from the theoretical 
literature have not been tested empirically and a number of empirical results have no clear 
theoretical bases and thus may derive different interpretations.        
 
Appendix 1 
1. Determination of the optimal education expense by maximising the net lifetime income 
We denote 1t tr   . 
it it t itI h e  ;  1 1/ 0it it it it tI e e h         
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2. Determination of the credit supply  
Individual (i,t)’s credit supply is 11t ritc  , i.e., the amount of income that must be saved and 
lent during her/his active period to fund the consumption ritc  of the retirement period.  
The individual’s maximisation programme is: 
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,
max (1 ) log log
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4. The steady state 
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Appendix 2 
The maximisation programme  1max (1 )(1 )
it
it it it it
s
I s s h
     provides individual i's 
optimal schooling time iˆts , which is the solution to the equation:     111 (1 )it it ith s s                (8A4) 
It can easily be verified that: 1ˆ / 0it its h    . 
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If there is a schooling time steady state sˆ , then at this steady state  1ˆ ,  it ith s h i   , 
which generates the human capital steady state  1/(1 )ˆ ˆh s   . By combining (8A4) with  1ˆt th s h   , this yields the following equation that determines a unique steady state sˆ : 
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By inserting  1it B ith     into ˆ(1 )it it j jh s    , we determine the stable steady state 
( 0 1  ):  1/(1 )ˆ ˆ ,  ,j B B j jh s j V U       
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